U.S. Activists and Palestine
U.S. Activists and Palestine*
Steve Fake
It is important that those of us struggling for a peaceful and just solution to the Israeli/Palestinian conflict have a clear sense of what we should be devoting our energies towards. In recent years many U.S. activists have become outspoken advocates of a one-state solution to the conflict. I believe this is a mistake that could have important consequences for the success of our movement.
There is wide agreement among those concerned with peace that the geographic and economic interconnectedness between Israelis and Palestinians make some form of political integration desirable - often envisioned as a secular democratic or bi-national state.
However, it must be born in mind that the long and ongoing history of violence between the two peoples has created a situation in which majorities of both Israelis and Palestinians oppose a one-state solution at present.1
The subjugation of the Palestinians is frequently compared to Apartheid South Africa and with good reason. However, an essential difference between the two situations is that the Bantustans were completely unviable and widely rejected by black South Africans – only collaborators who personally benefited consented to the scheme. In contrast, the majority of Palestinians support national independence, provided that the Palestinian state meets minimum requirements of justice and viability. We should also recognize that our job as activists is now considerably more difficult as the U.S. government is much more committed in its policies towards Israel than it was to its relations with South Africa.
Only after a period of peace and coexistence in which minimum standards of justice exist will majorities begin to favor political integration. According to the respected Israeli anthropologist and activist, Jeff Halper, this is similar to the views of most Palestinians. He writes that:
Palestinians prefer to struggle for an end to the Occupation and the establishment of a state on 22 percent of the country rather than shift to a campaign for a unitary state that would displace both Palestinian and Jewish national aspirations. Still, many Palestinians do express their hope that over time the two states would either merge into a single unit or at least federate.2
Implementing a just two-state settlement is not only more in line with the preferences of Palestinians and Israelis but Americans as well – a fact we are obliged to consider since we are the bankrollers of the Occupation.3
However unlikely the prospects of a full withdrawal from the Occupied Territories, it is more probable than the implementation of a one-state solution. As Noam Chomsky has commented:
If popular pressures in the US (primarily) and Israel have not even been able to compel the governments to accept a two-state settlement in accord with the international consensus, then, a fortiori, they will not be able to compel the governments to accept elimination of Israel in favor of a single Palestinian state in which Israeli Jews will soon be a minority.4
Electronic Intifada cofounder Ali Abunimah responds to this line of reasoning with the assertion that “The Palestinians do not have the political or material strength to stop the settlements and walls that prevent a two-state solution. But Israel’s settlements and walls are powerless in the struggle for a one-state solution. By removing territory from the equation, Israel loses its main card.”5 However, Israel’s main card is not territory but a monopoly on military power. That will not be altered by a shift to a one-state campaign.
The problem with our movement has not been the aim of ending the occupation – to whatever extent this has been true - but a lack of sufficient size, energy and focus.
A determination of the feasibility of a one-state or two-state solution rests largely on how one subjectively weighs the relative difficulties between overcoming resistance to the loss of a Jewish majority on the one hand and removing a sufficient number of settlers from the occupied territories on the other.
Certainly, the Israeli public’s desire to preserve the Jewish character of the Israeli state is more deeply held than its desire for control over the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and Gaza Strip. One recent poll found that 55 percent of Israelis supported a Palestinian state in the entirety of the West Bank and Gaza Strip minus “several large blocks of settlements” in 3 percent of the West Bank that would be annexed to Israel in return for “territory of similar size along the Gaza Strip.”6
Ha’aretz reports that 78 percent of Israeli Jews oppose a bi-national state and 67 percent of Israelis “strongly or moderately fear” the possibility of a one-state solution.7 Halper worries that Israel could resort to ethnic cleansing if seriously threatened with the loss of a Jewish majority.8
New England Committee to Defend Palestine activist Noah Cohen argues against deferring to the widespread opposition to a one-state solution, drawing a parallel to liberal arguments against a radical critique of U.S. policies in Vietnam on the strategic grounds that it would marginalize the movement.9 However, it is one thing to take a principled and unpopular stance even at the risk of being marginalized when the issues are clear (to use Cohen’s examples, U.S. imperialism in Vietnam and the Vietnamese right to self defense) and quite another to take an unpopular stance when it lacks majority support among the oppressed themselves.
If prominent currents of activism on the Israel/Palestine issue in the United States actively favor the direct transition to a single, democratic, secular country (or bi-national solution), it could well make the work of the movement more difficult as it is at odds with U.S. public opinion favoring a two-state solution and would alienate many individuals, such as some liberal Zionists, who would be sympathetic to the goal of ending our participation in atrocities and compelling Israel to accept a just settlement. Furthermore, it could even alienate the movement from the Palestinians themselves, at least if poll results are any basis for judgment.
Various groups have taken up the banner of a one-state solution, including New Jersey Solidarity, Al-Awda, and the New England Committee to Defend Palestine. On the other end of the left spectrum, Tikkun affirms that the “Jewish character” of Israel should be maintained. In general, a strong movement must welcome such diversity of beliefs so long as they adhere to our core goal, an end to U.S. aid to Israel and support for a just settlement. We should not specify support for one-state or two-states as a point of unity.10
We should by no means deny the racism inherent in the “Jewish character” of Israel but this need not negate working with liberal Zionist groups insofar as we agree on the importance of ending U.S. aid to Israel. Similarly, socialists did not refuse to work with white liberals during the Civil Rights era simply because the liberals were capitalists. This is true despite that fact that socialists generally believe capitalism is a fundamental cause of racism just as many activists believe Zionism is a fundamental cause of the injustice endured by Palestinians.
If one is serious about a campaign for implementation of a one-state solution in the short-term, the first place to secure support for the strategy is from the Palestinians. Promoting a one-state solution elsewhere, (at protests, in the mainstream media, etc.) before obtaining the support of most Palestinians seems rather misguided.
Of course, there’s nothing necessarily wrong in advocating positions that are widely unpopular. However, we must have short-term goals along with our more radical long-term goals. The latter require extensive education and organizing efforts to win support from the public and great patience on our part. Without more imminent aims we will be doomed to irrelevance. Socialists and anarchists did not dismiss the campaign for an 8-hour working day simply because they believed wage slavery should be abolished. If we ignore this principal we contribute little to ending U.S. military aid to Israel and the ongoing carnage by advocating an initial settlement that is both radical and unpopular among all the relevant parties.
Halper and many others argue that the facts on the ground make partition impractical.11 However, Halper himself recognizes that “Israel’s matrix of control could be dismantled if the international community had the required political will...”12
Four former directors of the Israeli Shin Bet believe evacuation of the settlers is feasible.13 The current evacuation of the Gaza settlers has been messy but has not given any indication that it would be impossible to repeat the process in the West Bank where, admittedly, there are many more settlers. Those settlers who refuse to cooperate with a withdrawal could also potentially be allowed to remain to become Palestinian citizens. These citizens would no doubt prove difficult for the new Palestinian government to govern but that seems like a far less serious problem than the current occupation.14
A central aspect of the argument for the two-state settlement is that any settlement that results in the loss of a Jewish majority in Israel or the abolition of Israel will be much harder to achieve than a viable Palestinian state with something less than full and immediate implementation of the right of return. Given the near uniform support for the right of return among Palestinians, this would seem to pose a serious problem.
Two plausible solutions that have some chance of acceptance among both Palestinians and Israelis are suggested by a 2003 survey of Palestinian refugees in the Occupied Territories, Jordan and Lebanon conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR).15 The first option comes from “a proposed solution to the refugee problem that was published in Palestinian papers in the light of the Taba negotiations in January 2000” in which a Palestinian state is established along pre-1967 borders and Israel recognizes the right of return. However, only a limited number of refugees would be permitted to return through an annual quota and the rest would receive compensation and live elsewhere. The report states that: “When asked how they would react to a Palestinian-Israeli agreement embracing the proposal, the overwhelming majority tended to approve such agreement even if most felt they would do so for the lack of better alternative.” It notes that “a small percentage” said that they “would not only oppose such solution but would also resist it.”
The second solution considered in the survey would postpone negotiation on the status of the refugees “while all other issues would be permanently settled.” In the meantime, the refugees would not be asked to forfeit the right of return and would be moved to new housing developments located in the evacuated Jewish settlements. The proposal received support from over 60 percent of the respondents in each of the refugee populations sampled: the Occupied Territories, Jordan, and Lebanon.16
There are many deficiencies in all two-state solutions. Nonetheless, it is hard to see how a just two-state settlement would not be a great advance. Achieving regional integration and an end to institutionalized Israeli racism can only be achieved over time - a period of time much longer than Palestinians should have to wait for an end to the most egregious Israeli crimes.
Some assert that a one-state solution presents better prospects for economic success for Palestinians than a two-state settlement, which could very easily take on characteristics of neocolonialism.17 On the other hand, Palestinians in a single state would clearly be at risk of becoming an economic underclass and a one-state solution would not necessarily force an end to settlement activity and seizure of the best lands and water resources. Mushtaq Khan, Senior Lecturer in Economics at the University of London, writes that “If a ‘Green Line’ Palestinian state could be formed… while the loss of employment opportunities in Israel would hurt, the presence of expatriate Palestinian capitalists means that even a state with PA governance characteristics could very soon become reasonably viable with full sovereignty and separation from Israel.”18
An unjust two-state settlement would produce a Palestinian state composed of scraps of territory of little economic worth with the most resource-rich areas of the Occupied Territories dominated by settlers and formally annexed to Israel. To avoid an unacceptable settlement our movement must be clear in its aims. Our mantra should be “End the Occupation. Just peace now!”
Halper believes a two-state settlement is “required, as a first stage of a more comprehensive regional solution”19 but is, by itself, inadequate and has thus advanced an intriguing “two-state plus” solution which:
asks that the Palestinians accept a state on something less than the entire occupied territories (perhaps on the Geneva model or the 96 percent suggested by Clinton) on condition that, within a reasonable period of time (five to ten years), the international community guarantees the emergence of a regional confederation. In such a confederation all residents have the right to live and work anywhere they choose.20
At this point, demands among Palestinians for a one-state campaign are mostly confined to elite elements of the population.21 However, if and when a one-state solution becomes the more plausible option, the situation will force Palestinians into taking it up as their demand. Birzeit University professor Ali Jarbawi says, “Most Palestinians prefer the idea of separation, because they want their own state. But Sharon’s idea of a two-state solution is to squeeze us into cantons…Given a choice between cantonization and one-state, Palestinians will go for the latter.”22 He predicts that “Ten years from now we are going to say: ‘We are under apartheid. This is apartheid and we want our rights.’”23
It is simply not our role to agitate among other U.S. citizens for how we think Palestinians should struggle to live in peace with Israelis. Rather, as solidarity activists we should work to end our complicity so that Palestinians may decide for themselves how best to seek a solution to the conflict. It should be emphasized that the course of action for American activists remains largely the same regardless of whether one believes an initial settlement should take the form of one state or two: to work to compel the U.S. government to stop blocking a just peace by providing military and economic aid to Israel. It is clear that the U.S. is the only country able to influence Israel to accept a decent settlement.
Sadly, there is little at present to indicate activism will compel the U.S. government to alter its policies in the region substantially. However, such matters are unpredictable. The burgeoning divestment movement, organizations like U.S. Campaign to End the Occupation and Jewish Voice for Peace, and the involvement of many church and student groups around the nation offer great hope and potential. Given the enormous responsibility our government has placed on us for the continuation of suffering in the region, we as U.S. citizens do not have the luxury of failing to act.
Steve Fake is an activist and graduate of the University of Pittsburgh. He can be contacted at freeradical83@gmail.com.
Notes
* A longer version of this article was published on August 10, 2005 in Left Hook with the title “Justice for Palestinians and the Role of U.S. Activists,” http://www.lefthook.org/Theory/Fake081005.html. I must express my gratitude to Michael Butler, Akunna Eneh, and Kevin Funk for providing helpful comments and suggestions on this essay. I found one-state.org/ to be a useful resource that brought my attention to many of the sources cited below. I take sole responsibility for the accuracy of the content and for the opinions expressed herein.
1. On Palestinian opinion, see, Cynthia Johnston, “The Democratic State of Israel-Palestine?,” Reuters, 8th July 2004, http://www.one-state.org/articles/2004/johnston.htm
Johnston writes that, “Recent Palestinian polls show up to 25 percent support for a bi-national state, although the majority still back two states. A smaller percentage see the only solution as replacing Israel with an Arab state.”
On Israeli opinion, see for instance, Peter Hirschberg, who cites a Tel Aviv University poll that finds seventy-eight percent of Israeli Jews favor a two-state solution while only six percent support a bi-national state. Presumably, support for a secular, democratic one-state solution that is not bi-national would receive even less support.
Peter Hirschberg, “'Hello, I'm Israeli-Palestinian',” Inter Press Service, February 10, 2004, http://www.antiwar.com/orig/hirschberg.php?articleid=1946
2. Jeff Halper, “Beyond Road Maps and Walls,” The Link, Volume 37, Issue 1, January-March, 2004, http://www.one-state.org/articles/2004/halper.htm
3. On American attitudes, see for instance, “Israel and the Palestinians: Support for a Palestinian State,” Program on International Policy Attitudes,
http://www.americans-world.org/digest/regional_issues/IsraelPalestinians/palstate.cfm.
4. Noam Chomsky interviewed by Justin Podur and Stephen Shalom, “Justice for Palestine? Q & A on prospects for a solution,” Znet, March 30, 2004, http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?ItemID=5240
5. Ali Abunimah, “Palestine/Israel: The End of the Road for the Two-State Solution?,” Seminar, Middle East Centre, St. Anthony’s College, Oxford, 20th February 2004, http://www.one-state.org/articles/2004/abunimah.htm
6. Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, “In the Post Arafat Era, Palestinians and Israelis Are More Willing to Compromise: For the First Time Majority Support For Clinton’s Permanent Status Settlement Package,” Press Release, Joint Palestinian-Israeli Public Opinion Poll, January 18, 2005, http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2005/jointpreelections05.html
Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, “Palestinians and Israelis Disagree on How to Proceed with the Peace Process,” Press Release, March 16, 2005, http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2005/p15ejoint.html
Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, “While Israeli Support for the Disengagement Drops, Israelis See Declining Prospects for the Settlement Project in the West Bank, Whereas Palestinians Expect it to Grow,” Press Release, June 16, 2005
http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2005/p16ejoint.html
The Associated Press, “Poll: 59% of Israelis support evacuation of settlements,” Jun. 10, 2003, http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/jp1006.htm
7. Gary Sussman, “The Challenge to the Two-State Solution,” Middle East Report 231, summer 2004. http://www.merip.org/mer/mer231/sussman.html
8. Jeff Halper interviewed by Jon Elmer, “Israel and the Empire,” FromOccupiedPalestine.org, 20 September 2003. http://www.fromoccupiedpalestine.org/node.php?id=776
9. Noah Cohen, “Noam Chomsky and ‘Left’ Apologetics for Injustice in Palestine,” Axis of Logic, August 23, 2004. http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?SectionID=22&ItemID=6109
10. For the views of the groups mentioned see the front-pages of the New Jersey Solidarity and the New England Committee in Defense of Palestine websites at http://www.newjerseysolidarity.org/ and http://www.onepalestine.org/, Al-Awda’s points of unity at http://www.al-awda.org/pointsofunity/, and Tikkun’s fundamental principles at http://www.tikkun.org/core_vision.
11. Jeff Halper interviewed by Jon Elmer, “Israel and the Empire,” FromOccupiedPalestine.org, 20 September 2003. http://www.fromoccupiedpalestine.org/node.php?id=776. Halper has elsewhere expressed no preference between one or two-state solutions or indicated that it is too soon to advocate for a single state.
12. Jeff Halper, “Paralysis over Palestine: Questions of Strategy,” Journal of Palestine Studies, Issue134, Winter2005,
http://www.palestine-studies.org/final/en/journals/content.php?aid=6368&jid=1&iid=134&vid=XXXIV&vol=194
13. Alex Fishman and Sima Kadmon, "We Are Seriously Concerned About the Fate of the State of Israel," Yedioth Ahronoth, November 14, 2003. Available on the Global Policy Forum website at http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/israel-palestine/2003/1118fate.htm, crediting Peace Now as the source for the English language text. The discussion first came to my attention in the Noam Chomsky interview with Justin Podur and Stephen Shalom, “Justice for Palestine? Q & A on prospects for a solution.”
14. For more on this possibility, see the 18/4/2005 discussion in Bitterlemons http://www.bitterlemons.org/previous/bl180405ed14.html among Yossi Alpher, “Too dangerous?,” Ghassan Khatib, “Outside the box,” Avi Farhan, “It’s in the Palestinian’s interest,” and Hassan Asfour, “Can they be citizens in our state?”
15. Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, “Results of PSR Refugees’ Polls in the West Bank/Gaza Strip, Jordan and Lebanon; On Refugees’ Preferences and Behavior in a Palestinian-Israeli Permanent Refugee Agreement, January-June2003,” Press Release, July 18, 2003, http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2003/refugeesjune03.html
The survey received criticism for allegedly attempting to manage Palestinian refugee opinion to indicate most refugees would not actually wish to exercise the right of return to Israel proper. The criticism does not impact the results I am interested in here.
16. Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, “Results of PSR Refugees’ Polls in the West Bank/Gaza Strip, Jordan and Lebanon; On Refugees’ Preferences and Behavior in a Palestinian-Israeli Permanent Refugee Agreement, January-June2003,” Press Release, Table 1, July 18, 2003, http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2003/reftable1.html
17. Lama Abu-Odeh, “The Case for Binationalism,” Boston Review, December 2001/January 2002, http://bostonreview.net/BR26.6/abu-odeh.html
18. Mushtaq Khan, “Memorandum submitted by Dr Mushtaq Husain Khan, Department of Economics, SOAS, University of London,” International Development Committee, House of Commons, October 2003, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200304/
cmselect/cmintdev/230/230we45.htm#note253
19. Jeff Halper, “A Middle Eastern Confederation: A regional ‘two-stage’ approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,” Arabic Media Internet Network, December 15, 2002, http://www.one-state.org/articles/2002/halper.htm
20. Jeff Halper, “Paralysis over Palestine: Questions of Strategy.”
21. On Palestinians one-state advocates coming from elite segments of society, see Cynthia Johnston, “The Democratic State of Israel-Palestine?” and Amayreh, Khaled, “Controversial Move,” Al-Ahram Weekly, 15-21 January 2004 as cited in Ali Abunimah, “Palestine/Israel: The End of the Road for the Two-State Solution?”
22. Hirschberg, Peter, “Hello, I’m Israeli-Palestinian,” as cited in Ali Abunimah, “Palestine/Israel: The End of the Road for the Two-State Solution?”
23. Cynthia Johnston, “The Democratic State of Israel-Palestine?”
Steve Fake
It is important that those of us struggling for a peaceful and just solution to the Israeli/Palestinian conflict have a clear sense of what we should be devoting our energies towards. In recent years many U.S. activists have become outspoken advocates of a one-state solution to the conflict. I believe this is a mistake that could have important consequences for the success of our movement.
There is wide agreement among those concerned with peace that the geographic and economic interconnectedness between Israelis and Palestinians make some form of political integration desirable - often envisioned as a secular democratic or bi-national state.
However, it must be born in mind that the long and ongoing history of violence between the two peoples has created a situation in which majorities of both Israelis and Palestinians oppose a one-state solution at present.1
The subjugation of the Palestinians is frequently compared to Apartheid South Africa and with good reason. However, an essential difference between the two situations is that the Bantustans were completely unviable and widely rejected by black South Africans – only collaborators who personally benefited consented to the scheme. In contrast, the majority of Palestinians support national independence, provided that the Palestinian state meets minimum requirements of justice and viability. We should also recognize that our job as activists is now considerably more difficult as the U.S. government is much more committed in its policies towards Israel than it was to its relations with South Africa.
Only after a period of peace and coexistence in which minimum standards of justice exist will majorities begin to favor political integration. According to the respected Israeli anthropologist and activist, Jeff Halper, this is similar to the views of most Palestinians. He writes that:
Palestinians prefer to struggle for an end to the Occupation and the establishment of a state on 22 percent of the country rather than shift to a campaign for a unitary state that would displace both Palestinian and Jewish national aspirations. Still, many Palestinians do express their hope that over time the two states would either merge into a single unit or at least federate.2
Implementing a just two-state settlement is not only more in line with the preferences of Palestinians and Israelis but Americans as well – a fact we are obliged to consider since we are the bankrollers of the Occupation.3
However unlikely the prospects of a full withdrawal from the Occupied Territories, it is more probable than the implementation of a one-state solution. As Noam Chomsky has commented:
If popular pressures in the US (primarily) and Israel have not even been able to compel the governments to accept a two-state settlement in accord with the international consensus, then, a fortiori, they will not be able to compel the governments to accept elimination of Israel in favor of a single Palestinian state in which Israeli Jews will soon be a minority.4
Electronic Intifada cofounder Ali Abunimah responds to this line of reasoning with the assertion that “The Palestinians do not have the political or material strength to stop the settlements and walls that prevent a two-state solution. But Israel’s settlements and walls are powerless in the struggle for a one-state solution. By removing territory from the equation, Israel loses its main card.”5 However, Israel’s main card is not territory but a monopoly on military power. That will not be altered by a shift to a one-state campaign.
The problem with our movement has not been the aim of ending the occupation – to whatever extent this has been true - but a lack of sufficient size, energy and focus.
A determination of the feasibility of a one-state or two-state solution rests largely on how one subjectively weighs the relative difficulties between overcoming resistance to the loss of a Jewish majority on the one hand and removing a sufficient number of settlers from the occupied territories on the other.
Certainly, the Israeli public’s desire to preserve the Jewish character of the Israeli state is more deeply held than its desire for control over the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and Gaza Strip. One recent poll found that 55 percent of Israelis supported a Palestinian state in the entirety of the West Bank and Gaza Strip minus “several large blocks of settlements” in 3 percent of the West Bank that would be annexed to Israel in return for “territory of similar size along the Gaza Strip.”6
Ha’aretz reports that 78 percent of Israeli Jews oppose a bi-national state and 67 percent of Israelis “strongly or moderately fear” the possibility of a one-state solution.7 Halper worries that Israel could resort to ethnic cleansing if seriously threatened with the loss of a Jewish majority.8
New England Committee to Defend Palestine activist Noah Cohen argues against deferring to the widespread opposition to a one-state solution, drawing a parallel to liberal arguments against a radical critique of U.S. policies in Vietnam on the strategic grounds that it would marginalize the movement.9 However, it is one thing to take a principled and unpopular stance even at the risk of being marginalized when the issues are clear (to use Cohen’s examples, U.S. imperialism in Vietnam and the Vietnamese right to self defense) and quite another to take an unpopular stance when it lacks majority support among the oppressed themselves.
If prominent currents of activism on the Israel/Palestine issue in the United States actively favor the direct transition to a single, democratic, secular country (or bi-national solution), it could well make the work of the movement more difficult as it is at odds with U.S. public opinion favoring a two-state solution and would alienate many individuals, such as some liberal Zionists, who would be sympathetic to the goal of ending our participation in atrocities and compelling Israel to accept a just settlement. Furthermore, it could even alienate the movement from the Palestinians themselves, at least if poll results are any basis for judgment.
Various groups have taken up the banner of a one-state solution, including New Jersey Solidarity, Al-Awda, and the New England Committee to Defend Palestine. On the other end of the left spectrum, Tikkun affirms that the “Jewish character” of Israel should be maintained. In general, a strong movement must welcome such diversity of beliefs so long as they adhere to our core goal, an end to U.S. aid to Israel and support for a just settlement. We should not specify support for one-state or two-states as a point of unity.10
We should by no means deny the racism inherent in the “Jewish character” of Israel but this need not negate working with liberal Zionist groups insofar as we agree on the importance of ending U.S. aid to Israel. Similarly, socialists did not refuse to work with white liberals during the Civil Rights era simply because the liberals were capitalists. This is true despite that fact that socialists generally believe capitalism is a fundamental cause of racism just as many activists believe Zionism is a fundamental cause of the injustice endured by Palestinians.
If one is serious about a campaign for implementation of a one-state solution in the short-term, the first place to secure support for the strategy is from the Palestinians. Promoting a one-state solution elsewhere, (at protests, in the mainstream media, etc.) before obtaining the support of most Palestinians seems rather misguided.
Of course, there’s nothing necessarily wrong in advocating positions that are widely unpopular. However, we must have short-term goals along with our more radical long-term goals. The latter require extensive education and organizing efforts to win support from the public and great patience on our part. Without more imminent aims we will be doomed to irrelevance. Socialists and anarchists did not dismiss the campaign for an 8-hour working day simply because they believed wage slavery should be abolished. If we ignore this principal we contribute little to ending U.S. military aid to Israel and the ongoing carnage by advocating an initial settlement that is both radical and unpopular among all the relevant parties.
Halper and many others argue that the facts on the ground make partition impractical.11 However, Halper himself recognizes that “Israel’s matrix of control could be dismantled if the international community had the required political will...”12
Four former directors of the Israeli Shin Bet believe evacuation of the settlers is feasible.13 The current evacuation of the Gaza settlers has been messy but has not given any indication that it would be impossible to repeat the process in the West Bank where, admittedly, there are many more settlers. Those settlers who refuse to cooperate with a withdrawal could also potentially be allowed to remain to become Palestinian citizens. These citizens would no doubt prove difficult for the new Palestinian government to govern but that seems like a far less serious problem than the current occupation.14
A central aspect of the argument for the two-state settlement is that any settlement that results in the loss of a Jewish majority in Israel or the abolition of Israel will be much harder to achieve than a viable Palestinian state with something less than full and immediate implementation of the right of return. Given the near uniform support for the right of return among Palestinians, this would seem to pose a serious problem.
Two plausible solutions that have some chance of acceptance among both Palestinians and Israelis are suggested by a 2003 survey of Palestinian refugees in the Occupied Territories, Jordan and Lebanon conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR).15 The first option comes from “a proposed solution to the refugee problem that was published in Palestinian papers in the light of the Taba negotiations in January 2000” in which a Palestinian state is established along pre-1967 borders and Israel recognizes the right of return. However, only a limited number of refugees would be permitted to return through an annual quota and the rest would receive compensation and live elsewhere. The report states that: “When asked how they would react to a Palestinian-Israeli agreement embracing the proposal, the overwhelming majority tended to approve such agreement even if most felt they would do so for the lack of better alternative.” It notes that “a small percentage” said that they “would not only oppose such solution but would also resist it.”
The second solution considered in the survey would postpone negotiation on the status of the refugees “while all other issues would be permanently settled.” In the meantime, the refugees would not be asked to forfeit the right of return and would be moved to new housing developments located in the evacuated Jewish settlements. The proposal received support from over 60 percent of the respondents in each of the refugee populations sampled: the Occupied Territories, Jordan, and Lebanon.16
There are many deficiencies in all two-state solutions. Nonetheless, it is hard to see how a just two-state settlement would not be a great advance. Achieving regional integration and an end to institutionalized Israeli racism can only be achieved over time - a period of time much longer than Palestinians should have to wait for an end to the most egregious Israeli crimes.
Some assert that a one-state solution presents better prospects for economic success for Palestinians than a two-state settlement, which could very easily take on characteristics of neocolonialism.17 On the other hand, Palestinians in a single state would clearly be at risk of becoming an economic underclass and a one-state solution would not necessarily force an end to settlement activity and seizure of the best lands and water resources. Mushtaq Khan, Senior Lecturer in Economics at the University of London, writes that “If a ‘Green Line’ Palestinian state could be formed… while the loss of employment opportunities in Israel would hurt, the presence of expatriate Palestinian capitalists means that even a state with PA governance characteristics could very soon become reasonably viable with full sovereignty and separation from Israel.”18
An unjust two-state settlement would produce a Palestinian state composed of scraps of territory of little economic worth with the most resource-rich areas of the Occupied Territories dominated by settlers and formally annexed to Israel. To avoid an unacceptable settlement our movement must be clear in its aims. Our mantra should be “End the Occupation. Just peace now!”
Halper believes a two-state settlement is “required, as a first stage of a more comprehensive regional solution”19 but is, by itself, inadequate and has thus advanced an intriguing “two-state plus” solution which:
asks that the Palestinians accept a state on something less than the entire occupied territories (perhaps on the Geneva model or the 96 percent suggested by Clinton) on condition that, within a reasonable period of time (five to ten years), the international community guarantees the emergence of a regional confederation. In such a confederation all residents have the right to live and work anywhere they choose.20
At this point, demands among Palestinians for a one-state campaign are mostly confined to elite elements of the population.21 However, if and when a one-state solution becomes the more plausible option, the situation will force Palestinians into taking it up as their demand. Birzeit University professor Ali Jarbawi says, “Most Palestinians prefer the idea of separation, because they want their own state. But Sharon’s idea of a two-state solution is to squeeze us into cantons…Given a choice between cantonization and one-state, Palestinians will go for the latter.”22 He predicts that “Ten years from now we are going to say: ‘We are under apartheid. This is apartheid and we want our rights.’”23
It is simply not our role to agitate among other U.S. citizens for how we think Palestinians should struggle to live in peace with Israelis. Rather, as solidarity activists we should work to end our complicity so that Palestinians may decide for themselves how best to seek a solution to the conflict. It should be emphasized that the course of action for American activists remains largely the same regardless of whether one believes an initial settlement should take the form of one state or two: to work to compel the U.S. government to stop blocking a just peace by providing military and economic aid to Israel. It is clear that the U.S. is the only country able to influence Israel to accept a decent settlement.
Sadly, there is little at present to indicate activism will compel the U.S. government to alter its policies in the region substantially. However, such matters are unpredictable. The burgeoning divestment movement, organizations like U.S. Campaign to End the Occupation and Jewish Voice for Peace, and the involvement of many church and student groups around the nation offer great hope and potential. Given the enormous responsibility our government has placed on us for the continuation of suffering in the region, we as U.S. citizens do not have the luxury of failing to act.
Steve Fake is an activist and graduate of the University of Pittsburgh. He can be contacted at freeradical83@gmail.com.
Notes
* A longer version of this article was published on August 10, 2005 in Left Hook with the title “Justice for Palestinians and the Role of U.S. Activists,” http://www.lefthook.org/Theory/Fake081005.html. I must express my gratitude to Michael Butler, Akunna Eneh, and Kevin Funk for providing helpful comments and suggestions on this essay. I found one-state.org/ to be a useful resource that brought my attention to many of the sources cited below. I take sole responsibility for the accuracy of the content and for the opinions expressed herein.
1. On Palestinian opinion, see, Cynthia Johnston, “The Democratic State of Israel-Palestine?,” Reuters, 8th July 2004, http://www.one-state.org/articles/2004/johnston.htm
Johnston writes that, “Recent Palestinian polls show up to 25 percent support for a bi-national state, although the majority still back two states. A smaller percentage see the only solution as replacing Israel with an Arab state.”
On Israeli opinion, see for instance, Peter Hirschberg, who cites a Tel Aviv University poll that finds seventy-eight percent of Israeli Jews favor a two-state solution while only six percent support a bi-national state. Presumably, support for a secular, democratic one-state solution that is not bi-national would receive even less support.
Peter Hirschberg, “'Hello, I'm Israeli-Palestinian',” Inter Press Service, February 10, 2004, http://www.antiwar.com/orig/hirschberg.php?articleid=1946
2. Jeff Halper, “Beyond Road Maps and Walls,” The Link, Volume 37, Issue 1, January-March, 2004, http://www.one-state.org/articles/2004/halper.htm
3. On American attitudes, see for instance, “Israel and the Palestinians: Support for a Palestinian State,” Program on International Policy Attitudes,
http://www.americans-world.org/digest/regional_issues/IsraelPalestinians/palstate.cfm.
4. Noam Chomsky interviewed by Justin Podur and Stephen Shalom, “Justice for Palestine? Q & A on prospects for a solution,” Znet, March 30, 2004, http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?ItemID=5240
5. Ali Abunimah, “Palestine/Israel: The End of the Road for the Two-State Solution?,” Seminar, Middle East Centre, St. Anthony’s College, Oxford, 20th February 2004, http://www.one-state.org/articles/2004/abunimah.htm
6. Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, “In the Post Arafat Era, Palestinians and Israelis Are More Willing to Compromise: For the First Time Majority Support For Clinton’s Permanent Status Settlement Package,” Press Release, Joint Palestinian-Israeli Public Opinion Poll, January 18, 2005, http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2005/jointpreelections05.html
Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, “Palestinians and Israelis Disagree on How to Proceed with the Peace Process,” Press Release, March 16, 2005, http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2005/p15ejoint.html
Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, “While Israeli Support for the Disengagement Drops, Israelis See Declining Prospects for the Settlement Project in the West Bank, Whereas Palestinians Expect it to Grow,” Press Release, June 16, 2005
http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2005/p16ejoint.html
The Associated Press, “Poll: 59% of Israelis support evacuation of settlements,” Jun. 10, 2003, http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/jp1006.htm
7. Gary Sussman, “The Challenge to the Two-State Solution,” Middle East Report 231, summer 2004. http://www.merip.org/mer/mer231/sussman.html
8. Jeff Halper interviewed by Jon Elmer, “Israel and the Empire,” FromOccupiedPalestine.org, 20 September 2003. http://www.fromoccupiedpalestine.org/node.php?id=776
9. Noah Cohen, “Noam Chomsky and ‘Left’ Apologetics for Injustice in Palestine,” Axis of Logic, August 23, 2004. http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?SectionID=22&ItemID=6109
10. For the views of the groups mentioned see the front-pages of the New Jersey Solidarity and the New England Committee in Defense of Palestine websites at http://www.newjerseysolidarity.org/ and http://www.onepalestine.org/, Al-Awda’s points of unity at http://www.al-awda.org/pointsofunity/, and Tikkun’s fundamental principles at http://www.tikkun.org/core_vision.
11. Jeff Halper interviewed by Jon Elmer, “Israel and the Empire,” FromOccupiedPalestine.org, 20 September 2003. http://www.fromoccupiedpalestine.org/node.php?id=776. Halper has elsewhere expressed no preference between one or two-state solutions or indicated that it is too soon to advocate for a single state.
12. Jeff Halper, “Paralysis over Palestine: Questions of Strategy,” Journal of Palestine Studies, Issue134, Winter2005,
http://www.palestine-studies.org/final/en/journals/content.php?aid=6368&jid=1&iid=134&vid=XXXIV&vol=194
13. Alex Fishman and Sima Kadmon, "We Are Seriously Concerned About the Fate of the State of Israel," Yedioth Ahronoth, November 14, 2003. Available on the Global Policy Forum website at http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/israel-palestine/2003/1118fate.htm, crediting Peace Now as the source for the English language text. The discussion first came to my attention in the Noam Chomsky interview with Justin Podur and Stephen Shalom, “Justice for Palestine? Q & A on prospects for a solution.”
14. For more on this possibility, see the 18/4/2005 discussion in Bitterlemons http://www.bitterlemons.org/previous/bl180405ed14.html among Yossi Alpher, “Too dangerous?,” Ghassan Khatib, “Outside the box,” Avi Farhan, “It’s in the Palestinian’s interest,” and Hassan Asfour, “Can they be citizens in our state?”
15. Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, “Results of PSR Refugees’ Polls in the West Bank/Gaza Strip, Jordan and Lebanon; On Refugees’ Preferences and Behavior in a Palestinian-Israeli Permanent Refugee Agreement, January-June2003,” Press Release, July 18, 2003, http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2003/refugeesjune03.html
The survey received criticism for allegedly attempting to manage Palestinian refugee opinion to indicate most refugees would not actually wish to exercise the right of return to Israel proper. The criticism does not impact the results I am interested in here.
16. Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, “Results of PSR Refugees’ Polls in the West Bank/Gaza Strip, Jordan and Lebanon; On Refugees’ Preferences and Behavior in a Palestinian-Israeli Permanent Refugee Agreement, January-June2003,” Press Release, Table 1, July 18, 2003, http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2003/reftable1.html
17. Lama Abu-Odeh, “The Case for Binationalism,” Boston Review, December 2001/January 2002, http://bostonreview.net/BR26.6/abu-odeh.html
18. Mushtaq Khan, “Memorandum submitted by Dr Mushtaq Husain Khan, Department of Economics, SOAS, University of London,” International Development Committee, House of Commons, October 2003, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200304/
cmselect/cmintdev/230/230we45.htm#note253
19. Jeff Halper, “A Middle Eastern Confederation: A regional ‘two-stage’ approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,” Arabic Media Internet Network, December 15, 2002, http://www.one-state.org/articles/2002/halper.htm
20. Jeff Halper, “Paralysis over Palestine: Questions of Strategy.”
21. On Palestinians one-state advocates coming from elite segments of society, see Cynthia Johnston, “The Democratic State of Israel-Palestine?” and Amayreh, Khaled, “Controversial Move,” Al-Ahram Weekly, 15-21 January 2004 as cited in Ali Abunimah, “Palestine/Israel: The End of the Road for the Two-State Solution?”
22. Hirschberg, Peter, “Hello, I’m Israeli-Palestinian,” as cited in Ali Abunimah, “Palestine/Israel: The End of the Road for the Two-State Solution?”
23. Cynthia Johnston, “The Democratic State of Israel-Palestine?”
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